

**STATEMENT BY**

**SCOTT E. JACOBS PRESIDENT, NEW CENTURY US  
BUILDING INTELLIGENT CAPACITY**

**BEFORE THE**

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**112<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS**

**ON**

**PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE IRREGULAR WARFARE CHALLENGES: PRIVATE  
SECTOR PERSPECTIVES**

**JUNE 28, 2013**

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**UNTIL RELEASED BY THE**

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

**UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this panel today. As a retired Federal special agent and as a graduate of the congressional fellowship program, I am acutely familiar with the leadership provided by this committee. As the current President of New Century US (NCUS), I would like to personally thank each and every one of you for your steadfast dedication to public service.

### Introduction

New Century US is a privately-held firm currently on contract with the U.S. government to provide, among other things, training and education support to the Afghan National Army(ANA). NCUS is the American subsidiary of the London-based New Century International and has been founded in a manner consistent with all laws, regulations, and protocols established by the U.S. government. The firm is proud of the variety of services it provides in support of the U.S. government and its allies. In support of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, New Century International currently provides training and mentoring support to the Afghan National Police (ANP). NCUS has also provided a similar service to authorities in a vis-à-vis a “train-the-trainer” program, an initiative authorized and funded through the DoD Counter Terrorism Technical Support Office for the U.S. military. Furthermore, NCUS continues to provide high-quality operations’ analysis and intelligence-related support to a variety of other federally-funded initiatives. In sum, the firm’s programs and the nature of the collective experience of New Century personnel, positions the firm as both an observer of irregular challenges worldwide and as a knowledgeable proponent of irregular solutions.

### Current Activities

The flagship program of our firm is called “Legacy,” a program first implemented in the western Iraq province of al Anbar and currently in place in Afghanistan. Aimed at improving both the capability and capacity of the ANP and ANA forces, the current iteration of Legacy employs a specific doctrine and

teaching methodology, one based on the experience of the British constabulary force – or Special Branch – in Northern Ireland during the conflict of the late 1970s and '80s.

The value-added of the New Century approach lies not only in its well-developed Legacy methodology but also – and most importantly – depends on its deep well of experience found within the ranks of qualified personnel. As I previously mentioned, the success of the firm rests with “doers” – several veterans of Special Branch and the Northern Ireland conflict, as well as others more recently seasoned after years of serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the doctrine and methodology of the Legacy program is designed to leverage and reflect the richness of this experience. The curricula of the respective programs thus includes both in-class discussion and the all-important, in-the-field “hands on” training.

New Century provided training has produced a number of quantifiable results in support of the NATO mission in Afghanistan. By adapting traditional Special Branch tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to accommodate and befit the unique circumstances of the local culture, the Legacy methodology has developed and nurtured an ever-diligent, wiser, and more coordinated Afghan police force. Since inception, the Afghan Legacy program has directly facilitated the capture of numerous improvised explosive devices, detonators, suicide vests, munitions, and other weapons. Furthermore, the resulting police force developed and tutored by our small, hybrid teams of cultural advisers and former special police personnel has been responsible for the arrest, capture, or death of more than six hundred insurgents. We remain honored and humbled by the following praise offered by a former 3-star American General at the beginning of the effort: “New Century’s program is immediately effective.”

But the greatest achievement of Legacy, we believe, lies in the much-improved reporting and increased coordination apparent throughout the larger ANP community, *and* in the effective fusion of military, intelligence, and law enforcement TTPs in support of a larger counter-insurgency (COIN) and

counter-terrorism mission. We believe our hybrid approach is notably consistent with David Kilcullen's views about the prerequisites of an effective COIN strategy when he writes in his book, *Accidental Guerilla*:

"[P]olice intelligence analysts are a good first step, and the police intelligence capability should grow naturally to include informant networks, undercover police officers, and *joint police-military intelligence centers*."<sup>1</sup>

We also agree with the counsel of National Defense University professor Bard E. O'Neill when he argues in favor of creating such a force before the onset of an insurgency:

"[W]ise governments turn to specially trained police and intelligence agencies for a solution...Keeping the military out of the day-to-day business of countering terrorists in favor of special police forces can be done even when the latter are part of the military establishment."<sup>2</sup>

And so, at New Century we believe a focus on improving the capacity of the Afghan – and other host-nation – security forces is a wise and an intelligent investment for supporting American foreign policy objectives, as it also offers the potential to build an effective residual or "leave-behind" security force when a U.S. military presence is reduced or simply unavailable. As U.S. taxpayers, we also view this approach as a wise and cost-effective investment strategy for leveraging limited public resources.

### The Strategic Landscape

The firm believes in, embraces, and supports the all-important "by, with, and through" creed of the Special Operations Forces community as it applies to meeting U.S. foreign policy objectives. We view this indirect approach as practical and essential for working with foreign allies, as well as for identifying and confronting irregular challenges around the globe – especially in environments requiring a limited

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<sup>1</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare*, Dulles, Va.: Brassey's, 1990, p. 129.

counter-insurgency response. And because both irregular threats abroad and federal budget pressures at home are almost certain to continue, we believe the indirect and *irregular* approach will become even more important in the days ahead.

Terrorism, insurgency, crime, and the illicit trafficking of drugs and humans – these are the activities that promise to litter the global strategic landscape in the years ahead. They already exist today in too many regions of the world – in Africa, South America, and across Asia – where weak nation-states are incapable of mounting an effective response. If ignored or unassisted, some of these states may falter and fail and follow the path of Afghanistan in the 1990s or of Somalia today – enlarging evermore that part of the world in which American ideals and interests are threatened or under siege. A carefully-targeted assistance program, therefore, would be wise, one designed to develop and empower the local authorities of American allies. Just imagine the strength of America’s strategic position if the local authorities in the following nations simultaneously mounted with U.S. assistance a more effective and sustainable counter-terrorism and COIN program: Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, the Central African Republic, Chad, Peru, Thailand, and the Philippines. Imagine, too, the improved security posture and greater moral authority of America if both the U.S. State Department and the Department of Defense (DoD) combined efforts and jointly offered security reform assessments to potential partners and allies around the globe.

#### Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future

The Afghan Legacy program adopted the same goals as those of the original program in Iraq: first, develop a locally-based human collection and analysis capability; and second, establish an information-gathering and investigative infrastructure within the police to support COIN strategic objectives. We believe we achieved both of these objectives and have learned a number of important lessons about COIN and Irregular Warfare (IW) along the way.

First, a thorough understanding of both the local- and national-level strategic environments is essential and enhances the performance of the small, hybrid teams of mentors and advisers. This requires keeping an eye on both the larger picture and strategic aim while examining and researching the local networks and possible biases of families, tribes, and local leaders. A thorough understanding of the environment also allows a training team to keep a focus on the proper objectives throughout the full spectrum of the program's performance, or from the early stages of planning through actual training, implementation, and review. This level of understanding can be produced by an initial assessment conducted by a small advance team of researchers.

Second, designing and tailoring a flexible doctrine and training regime increases local acceptance of the program. In Iraq, we noticed that trainees were *experiential* learners and responded best to role-playing scenarios and also responded well to stories about veteran experiences in the Northern Ireland campaign. In Afghanistan, we discovered and thus designed and implemented a simpler and streamlined reporting methodology, one more suitable to a culture with such a low literacy rate.

Third, in COIN campaigns the timely reporting of information is necessary for it to be useful or actionable, placing a premium on adequate communication habits and requiring a close relationship between the trainers and the trainees.

Fourth, future field surveys and training efforts should also assess the natural respect for the rule of law in a specific country and lend attention to the workings and integrity of the judicial branch of government.

Fifth – and this is important – for a Special Branch-like activity to ultimately succeed the U.S. military must embrace it as part of an overall COIN doctrine and strategy, budget and train for it, and

provide daily support for it in the field. Failure to provide adequate transportation and security support, for instance, might derail the entire effort.

Sixth, effective COIN efforts may take time and require patience. The British success in Northern Ireland, for example, took over two decades to secure. Therefore, U.S. policymakers should also consider preventive programs along the lines of Professor's O'Neill's counsel and remain mindful of the following phrase: "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."

A final observation is actually a concern and pertains to the point just made about doctrine, training, and budgeting for such a capability. Despite significant gains in the field and notwithstanding the 2008 issuance of a DoD Directive on IW (i.e., 3000.07), the department and each of the military services have remained somewhat listless with respect to this important subject. The 2008 Directive assigned additional duties to both Special Operations Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, granting these organizations lead roles for defining, guiding, and coordinating IW-related activities across DoD. And yet five years later, we still do not see any tangible leadership on these issues anywhere in the department. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance only lightly referenced the concept, and no true champion has emerged for institutionalizing such lessons or for providing a sustainable budget.

### Final Thoughts

The complex nature of the world requires innovative solutions. At New Century we strongly believe a large part of the solution lies in the fusion of the conventional and the unconventional, in both the regular and the irregular, and in a greater collaboration between the communities of law enforcement, intelligence, and military professionals. We also believe in the use of small, highly-

experienced training teams for building the capacity of our allies, and for constructing a defensive network of collaborators in various hotspots – or potential hotspots – around the world.

In a recent on-line article retired General Stan McChrystal noted that it takes a network to defeat a network, and this is precisely the situation we find ourselves in today.<sup>3</sup> Ironically, his comment echoes language authored by this subcommittee and included in the House reports accompanying passage of both the 2011 and the 2012 National Defense Authorization Acts:

“The committee remains concerned that the Secretary of Defense has not taken full advantage of a novel approach that takes into account an understanding of the tribal landscape and invests in developing host nation security forces, particularly local police organizations that maintain close ties with and function to protect the local population. The committee praised this approach, the Legacy program, in the committee report (H.Rept. 111-491) accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. In the report, the committee noted special interest in the “Attack of the Network” approach used in the Republic of Iraq and Afghanistan under the Legacy program. Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of the following:

- 1) The applicability of the Legacy program in other operations and regions where networked based threats are present or where conditions are conducive to supporting these threats; and
- 2) Options for an appropriate management structure within the Department to institutionalize and sustain the capabilities that Legacy and similar programs provide.”<sup>4</sup>

At New Century we agree with both this assessment and General McChrystal’s assertion and have come to this conclusion after years spent toiling in the field. We feel that the combination of our unique methodology and depth of experience offers the perfect recipe for disrupting the forces of terrorism, crime, and subversion. But more visionary and effective leadership is needed in the U.S. government, just as more international partners and allies are required. Our nation cannot do it alone.

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<sup>3</sup> Stanley McChrystal, *Lesson from Iraq: It Takes a Network to Defeat a Network*, <http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130621110027-86145090-lesson-from-iraq-it-takes-a-network-to-defeat-a-network?trk=eml-mktg-celeb-sc-prehed> (June 2013).

<sup>4</sup> *The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf>; *The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012*, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt78/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt78.pdf>.



“By, with, and through,” is an effective guiding principle for the United States in the years ahead. We recommend that we follow it.